Armenia's Foreign Policy: Keeping Every Door Open

Armenia is trying to do something that sounds simple on paper and becomes much harder the moment geopolitics gets involved: keep every door open.

The Armenian government’s new 2026–2031 program makes that ambition fairly clear. Yerevan says it will continue pursuing what it calls a “balanced and balancing” foreign policy, with the broader goal of making Armenia’s external environment more stable and, perhaps more importantly, making the country less dependent on any single foreign power.

It is an ambitious strategy. Armenia wants better relations with its immediate neighbors, deeper ties with the European Union and United States, stronger partnerships with France, China and India, continued engagement with Russia, and closer cooperation with Iran.

In other words, Yerevan is not choosing one geopolitical camp. It is trying to build enough relationships that it doesn't have to.

The neighborhood comes first

The most interesting part of the government's strategy is that it starts close to home.

For years, Armenia's geography has often looked more like a constraint than an advantage. Two of its borders have been closed, regional transport routes have been complicated by political disputes, and the country's security has been heavily influenced by relationships with larger powers.

The government now wants to change that equation.

Relations with Azerbaijan, Türkiye, Georgia and Iran are placed at the center of its regional strategy. The idea is straightforward: Armenia needs to become comfortable in its own neighborhood rather than constantly looking outside the region for political, economic or security support.

That is easier said than done.

Azerbaijan: turning peace into something tangible

The government says it will continue working toward signing and ratifying the peace agreement with Azerbaijan and completing the delimitation and demarcation of the border.

But there is an important detail here. Yerevan is also talking about something less diplomatic and more practical: business and people.

Increasing contacts between Armenian and Azerbaijani civil societies, encouraging business ties and expanding bilateral trade are all included in the plan.

That suggests an understanding that signing a peace agreement is one thing. Making peace feel normal is another.

A document signed by governments can end a conflict. It takes considerably longer for ordinary people and businesses to start treating each other as neighbors rather than former enemies.

Türkiye could change Armenia’s geography

Türkiye is another major piece of the puzzle.

The government wants diplomatic relations, an open border and at least two modern border crossings. It also wants to restart and expand transport, energy and digital infrastructure.

If that actually happens, the consequences for Armenia could be much bigger than simply having another open border.

Armenia could gain new trade routes, new economic opportunities and better access to regional infrastructure. A border that has represented isolation for decades could gradually become an economic asset.

That is why normalization with Türkiye is not just a diplomatic issue. It is an economic and strategic one.

Iran remains indispensable

Then there is Iran, which occupies a particularly important place in Armenia's calculations.

Yerevan plans to maintain active political dialogue with Tehran and deepen trade and economic cooperation, particularly in energy. It also wants to develop border infrastructure and expand transportation links through Iranian territory.

The North-South and Persian Gulf-Black Sea routes are especially important.

For Armenia, this is about more than moving goods from one place to another. It is about creating alternatives.

The more routes Armenia has, the less vulnerable it becomes when one route is blocked, politically complicated or economically unattractive.

Georgia is the other piece of the regional puzzle

Georgia is equally important because it provides Armenia with one of its main connections to the wider world.

The government plans to deepen the strategic partnership with Tbilisi, particularly in transport, energy, trade and infrastructure.

Put all of this together—Azerbaijan, Türkiye, Georgia and Iran—and a larger picture begins to emerge.

Armenia is trying to become more connected to its neighborhood, not trapped by it.

That may ultimately be the most important idea in the entire foreign-policy program.

Europe and America are still firmly in the picture

None of this means Armenia is turning away from the West.

Quite the opposite.

The government says it will continue deepening its strategic partnership with the European Union, including through implementation of the Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement and further alignment with European standards.

Visa liberalization is also on the agenda.

The relationship with the United States is expected to grow as well. Armenia plans to expand cooperation under its strategic partnership framework with Washington, including through the TRIPP project and the development of energy and railway infrastructure.

This is where the “balancing” part of Armenia's foreign policy becomes particularly visible.

Yerevan wants closer relations with Washington and Brussels without severing relationships elsewhere.

That is a difficult balancing act—but it is also the essence of the strategy.

And then there is Russia

Russia presents perhaps the most complicated part of the equation.

The government is not talking about abandoning Moscow. Instead, it says relations should be transformed, developed and deepened under new conditions.

That wording is significant.

Armenia appears to be accepting that its relationship with Russia has changed, while also recognizing that Russia remains an important economic and political partner.

The same pragmatic approach can be seen in Armenia's continued participation in the Eurasian Economic Union.

Again, the message is essentially: keep the relationship, but don't let the relationship define the entire foreign policy.

China and India are no longer side stories

China and India are also moving higher up Armenia's diplomatic agenda.

Armenia wants to deepen its strategic partnership with China and pursue practical cooperation in areas identified by the two countries.

With India, the list is even broader: economics, defense, transportation, education, healthcare and technology.

This is important because it shows that Armenia's diversification strategy isn't limited to the familiar East-versus-West debate.

Yerevan is looking beyond it.

A bigger diplomatic footprint

The government also wants to expand Armenia's network of strategic partners, naming countries such as Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Kazakhstan, Luxembourg, Bulgaria, Croatia and Lithuania.

It plans to remain active in international organizations including the United Nations, Council of Europe, OSCE and European Political Community, while seeking membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

There is also an explicit push toward stronger relations with countries in the Middle East and Africa.

Essentially, Armenia wants more friends in more places.

The real test begins now

On paper, the strategy is impressive. But foreign policy documents are easy to write. Implementing them is where things become complicated.

Armenia cannot control whether Azerbaijan and Türkiye move at the same speed it does. It cannot determine how regional powers will behave. And it certainly cannot dictate what happens in the wider geopolitical competition involving Russia, the United States, Europe, China and others.

What Armenia can do is create more options.

And that seems to be the central idea behind this five-year plan.

Instead of relying heavily on one relationship, one security arrangement or one transportation route, Yerevan wants several of each.

It is a bit like making sure you have more than one exit from a building.

That may not sound particularly glamorous. But for a small country living in one of the world's more complicated neighborhoods, having options can be a form of power.

Armenia's foreign-policy strategy for the next five years is therefore not really about choosing East or West.

It is about trying to make sure Armenia can work with East, West, North and South—and still have a road of its own.